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Abstract. The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification is the distinction between having justification to believe P (= propositional justification) versus having a justified belief in P (= doxastic justification). The focus of this paper is on doxastic justification and on what conditions are necessary for having it. In particular, I challenge the basing demand on doxastic justification, i.e., the idea that one can have a doxastically justified belief only if one’s belief is based on an epistemically appropriate reason. This demand has been used to refute versions of coherentism and conservatism about perceptual justification as well as to defend phenomenal “conservatism” and other views besides. In what follows I argue that there is virtually no reason to think there is a basing demand on doxastic justification. I also argue that even if the basing demand were true, it would still fail to serve the dialectical purposes for which it has been employed in arguments concerning coherentism, conservatism, and phenomenal “conservatism”. I conclude by discussing the fact that knowledge has a basing demand and show why this needn’t raise the same sort of problems for coherentism and conservatism that doxastic justification’s basing demand seemed to. 
1 The Basing Demand on Doxastic Justification
A venerable host of epistemologists tell us that at least three factors are necessary for having a doxastically justified belief in P: a belief in P, propositional justification to believe P, and that one believe P for (on the basis of) an epistemically appropriate reason to believe P.​[1]​ We will characterize this last condition thus: 

The Basing Demand (TBD): Necessarily, S has a doxastically justified belief in P only if S believes P for (on the basis of) an epistemically appropriate reason to believe P.

Eventually we’ll say a bit more about what an “epistemically appropriate reason” is, but for now we’ll follow received wisdom and take it to be one’s source of justification, i.e., whatever it is that makes it the case that one has propositional justification.​[2]​ The idea is this. Suppose your perceptual experience as of a hand is your source of justification to believe that a hand exists. According to TBD, if you are to have a doxastically justified belief that a hand exists, it’s not enough that you have a perceptual experience as of a hand, and that you also believe that a hand exists. Your belief must be related in the right sort of way to your perceptual experience. Specifically, your belief that a hand exists must be based on your perceptual experience; your perceptual experience must be your reason for believing it. 
TBD enjoys wide support. For example, we find Alston [1989: 108] claiming that: 
 [it’s] conceptually true that one is justified in believing that p iff one’s belief that p is based on an adequate ground....

Korcz [2000: 46] writes that: 
The epistemic basing relation is the relation which must hold between a person’s belief and the adequate reasons for holding that belief if the belief is to be epistemically justified by those reasons.

Pollock and Cruz [1999: 35-36] assert that: 
To be justified in believing something it is not sufficient merely to have a good reason for believing it. One could have a good reason at one’s disposal but never make the connection. [In such a case] what is lacking is that you do not believe the conclusion on the basis of those reasons. 
Many other epistemologists agree.​[3]​ 
However, TBD is not just of sociological interest. It has been used to great effect in a variety of epistemological debates. For example, Pollock and Cruz [1999: 79] have used TBD to argue against the coherentist view that the only thing that affords one propositional justification to believe P is the fact that P coheres with one’s overall set of beliefs. The problem, they argue, is that such a view has severe skeptical consequences, ruling out doxastic justification (and hence knowledge). This skeptical cost is argued to follow from TBD and the fact that we cannot (or at least typically do not) base our beliefs on facts about coherence. Thus coherentism results in a form of skepticism about doxastic justification for any thinker who fails to base their beliefs on facts about coherence.​[4]​ 
Silins [2007: 118] has issued a similar argument against conservatism about perceptual justification, i.e., the view that one’s source of perceptual justification is always constituted by two things: one’s perceptual experiences and one’s source of justification to rule out skeptical hypotheses.​[5]​ But given that we typically do not base our perceptual beliefs on the later it follows that all such perceptual beliefs are typically not based on their source of justification. Thus, given TBD, conservatism seems to imply that we typically lack doxastically justified perceptual beliefs.​[6]​ 
For a final example, take Huemer’s [2007: 39-42; 2011] argument in support of the view that appearances (seemings) are sources of justification: 

(i) All our beliefs (in relevant cases) are based on appearances. 
(ii) A belief is doxastically justified only if what it is based upon constitutes an adequate source of justification. 
Thus, 
(iii) If appearances are not a source of justification, then all our beliefs are not doxastically justified, including the belief (if one has it) that appearances are not a source of justification.

Premise (ii) is basically TBD wedded to the standard assumption we made above: that one’s source of justification to believe P is the only epistemically appropriate reason for one to believe P. And with (iii) and the addition of the anti-skeptical claim that at least many of our appearance-based beliefs are doxastically justified, it can easily be argued that appearances are a source of justification. Huemer calls the view that appearances are sources of justification “phenomenal conservatism”, but to avoid confusion with the previously mentioned conservative view and to highlight its foundationalist implications, I’ll refer to this view as ‘phenomenal foundationalism’. There are many things to say about Huemer’s argument, but for present purposes I just want us to bear in mind the crucial role TBD plays in it. 
These are but some of the interesting applications to which TBD has been put,​[7]​ and these arguments have seemed to many to offer significant, if not also decisive, reasons for their conclusions. Part of the reason for this is the fact that TBD has been thought to be a kind of “first principle” of epistemology which cannot reasonably be rejected. But in what follows I will argue that there is virtually no reason to endorse TBD. I will also argue that even if TBD were true, it would still fail to serve the dialectical purposes it has been thought to serve in the above arguments against coherentism and conservatism and on behalf of phenomenal foundationalism.​[8]​ 
2 Disanalogy and Explanatory Non-Necessity
The idea that TBD could be false will doubtless strike many epistemologists as extremely counterintuitive. But we can warm up to the idea by considering what kind of normative status justification happens to be and by considering whether principles analogous to TBD fail in domains other than epistemology. 
So, what kind of normative status is justification? Frequently, epistemologists just take the concept of (epistemic) justification to be the concept of (epistemic) permissibility. For example, Goldman [1986: 59] claims that a view of justification as permissibility is “warranted by purely semantic considerations”; Wedgwood [2012: 274] says that “...to say that a belief is justified is to say no more than that it is permissible...”; Pollock and Cruz [1999: 123] explain the notion justification by saying that “Justification is a matter of epistemic permissibility...”. Many other epistemologists tether justification to permissibility.​[9]​ The primary grounds for thinking justification is permissibility are conceptual–as indicated by Goldman and Wedgewood. That justification can be analyzed (at least partly) in terms of permissibility strikes me as extremely intuitive, and in what follows I will make the simplifying assumption that to judge that some act or attitude is justified is just to judge that that act or attitude is permissible.​[10]​ 
So, what would a principle analogous to TBD look like in other domains? We’ll focus on the following: 

TBDm: Necessarily, S’s act of A-ing is morally justified only if S As for (on the basis of) a morally appropriate reason to A.

TBDm is the moral counterpart of TBD, claiming that the moral justification of an action, just like the epistemic justification of a belief, depends on the satisfaction of a basing requirement. Take, for example, the (token) act of Jack feeding some starving children. According to TBDm, in order for Jack’s act to be morally justified (permitted), his reasons for feeding them must be morally appropriate. TBDm might strike some as just as plausible as TBD, after all, there’s something morally defective in acting for morally inappropriate reasons. 
But the failure of TBDm is something many ethical theories imply insofar as they do not identify one’s reasons for acting as a necessary condition for an action to be morally justified. Take act consequentialism for example. So long as it’s not a necessary fact that the best consequences (or near enough) follow from acts that are performed for morally appropriate reasons, there will be worlds where there are morally justified actions that are not performed for morally appropriate reasons. Moreover, some consequentialists seem to explicitly deny TBD in claiming that one’s motivations for performing an action are irrelevant to its being right or wrong.​[11]​ For another example, according to W. D. Ross [2002: 21] it is sufficient for the moral justification of an act that one have a prima facie duty to perform the act.​[12]​ But his candidate prima facie duties do not include one’s reasons for performing the kinds of action those duties refer to. For instance, according to Ross we have a prima facie duty to keep our promises, to make reparations for harm done to others, and to display gratitude to those who’ve done good to us. But none of these, nor any of his other duties, are duties to act for appropriate reasons. Thus, Ross’ theory allows for there to be cases where an action is morally justified though it’s not performed for a morally appropriate reason. Moreover, Ross [2002: 4-6; 20-23] explicitly denies TBDm when he affirms that the moral rightness of an action is independent of the motivations for which it is done.​[13]​ For a final example take virtue ethics which tells us that the moral justification of an action is determined by what an ideal virtuous agent would do.​[14]​ To be sure, such an ideal agent would never perform an action without performing it for an appropriate reason. But it does not follow from this that all those who do perform actions apart from such reasons fail to perform acts that are morally justified. For it is not the actual actions of imperfect agents which ground moral justification according to virtue ethics. So again we have a normative theory that implies the failure of TBDm , and it’s similarly easy to see how TBDm fails according to a variety of other normative ethical theories. 
Indeed, this is as it should be for reflection on concrete cases seems to demand the failure of TBDm. Recall Jack’s act. Suppose he were to feed the children solely for the purpose of exacting mildly exploitative favors from them later. Intuitively, his act of feeding them is morally justified (permissible) even if it’s performed for reasons that are morally inappropriate.​[15]​ Or again, suppose Sam saved a child from certain death, not because Sam cared for the child’s well-being, nor because Sam thought it his duty, nor because Sam for some reason was unconsciously responsive to some other morally appropriate reason for saving the child. Rather, Sam’s sole reason for saving the child is that the child’s survival would mean some (possibly small) degree of suffering for someone else. However poor Sam’s reasons for saving the child, his act of saving the child remains morally justified. As Arpaly and others have pointed out, what is intuitively wrong and criticizable in such cases is not the agent’s act, but the agent and his reasons for acting as he did.​[16]​ 
So both normative theories of ethics and concrete cases suggest that TBDm is, if not outright false, a controversial moral doctrine. But if this is the state of TBDm, it is somewhat surprising to find TBD to be getting on so well in epistemology. Indeed, one might think that moral and epistemic domains are similar enough that principles like TBD and TBDm should stand or fall together. So we must wonder what special epistemological considerations there are on behalf of TBD. 
Let’s have a look at the sort of concrete cases epistemologists typically take to support TBD: 

STUBBORN EVOLUTIONIST
Henry has been exposed to a number of rationally compelling arguments for the theory of evolution. Despite understanding these arguments, Henry refuses to accept [evolution], through sheer stubbornness. One day, Henry’s tarot card reader tells him that, based on a recent tarot reading, she has determined that the theory of evolution is true. Henry then finally accepts evolution [on the basis of the tarot reading].​[17]​ 
DERELICT JUROR
Imagine two jurors, Miss Knowit and Miss Not, deliberating about the case of Mr. Mansour. Both jurors have paid close attention throughout the trial. As a result, both have good reason to believe that Mansour is guilty. Each juror goes on to form the belief that Mansour is guilty, which he in fact is. Miss Knowit believes he’s guilty because of the evidence presented during the trial. Miss Not believes he’s guilty because he looks suspicious.​[18]​

These cases have a certain structure. They involve an agent who intuitively has propositional justification to believe a claim P in virtue of having epistemically appropriate reasons R, but the agent doesn’t believe P on the basis of R. Rather, he believes P solely on the basis of an epistemically inappropriate reason, R*. Let’s refer to such cases as cases of ‘Bad Basing’.​[19]​ 
One thing is clear about cases of Bad Basing: 

The Core Insight: At least one positive epistemic property is lacking in all cases of Bad Basing because the specified agent has based their belief solely on an epistemically inappropriate reason.

The question, then, is what epistemological principle correctly explains this insight. TBD affords us one explanation of The Core Insight: one positive epistemic property missing is doxastic justification and it is missing because in order to have it one must base their belief on an epistemically appropriate reason.​[20]​ 
But compare this with how certain moral theorists have regarded analogous moral cases of “Bad Basing”, e.g., cases like Jack’s act of feeding the starving children in order to exact mildly inappropriate future favors or Sam’s rescue of the child in order to cause another to suffer. As discussed above, a number of moral theorists have held that the moral defect in such cases doesn’t concern the agent’s action but the agent himself. Specifically, they have (a) distinguished between the moral permissibility of actions from the moral praiseworthiness and blamelessness of agents who perform them, and then (b) hold that an agent can act permissibly while being blameworthy (or at least not praiseworthy) because one failed to perform a permissible action for a morally appropriate reason.​[21]​ Thus moral cases of “Bad Basing” have been taken to offer no motivation whatsoever for TBDm. 
Notice that we can offer the same sort of explanation for The Core Insight: (a*) the epistemic justification of a belief is distinct from the praiseworthiness and blamelessness of agents, and (b*) an agent can hold a doxastically justified belief while being blameworthy (or at least not praiseworthy) because he fails to hold his doxastically justified belief for an epistemically appropriate reason. (a*) is widely endorsed by epistemologists,​[22]​ while (b*) is not (or would not be) because it is inconsistent with TBD. But TBD threatens our ability to explain The Core Insight with (b*) only if there is some independent reason to think TBD is true. So, again, we must ask what special reasons there are in support of TBD, and we cannot simply appeal to TBD’s ability to help us provide a prima facie reasonable explanation of The Core Insight, for principles inconsistent with TBD, such as (b*), can do that too. 
3 Special Pleading
Here are six general reasons I can think of to favor TBD and it’s implication that in cases of Bad Basing one lacks doxastic justification. None are without problems. 
Reason 1: Intuitiveness. Alston [1989: 140] claimed it is a conceptual truth that doxastic justification has a basing requirement. Thus one might think that we have a fairly immediate reason to endorse TBD stemming from our intuitions. 
Against this, I think it helps to consider the question of whether it’s possible for someone to do the right thing for the wrong reasons. Clearly it is, at least if we’re thinking of moral or pragmatic evaluation. So shouldn’t something similar be the case in epistemology? Now, I grant that it is extremely intuitive to think that, necessarily, there is something epistemically defective in holding a belief for an epistemically inappropriate reason. But it is unclear that the defect involved implies that the belief is unjustified. Rather, it seems to me to that the primary defect resides in the person who holds the belief for the defect has to do with their unresponsiveness to appropriate reasons. So I do not share Alston’s intuitions which are supposed to clearly support TBD. But for those who do have such intuitions, the fact that TBD is not needed to explain The Core Insight and the fact that TBDm is arguably not a conceptual truth of moral philosophy surely suggests that we need some additional reason for TBD if we’re to endorse it. 
Reason 2: Explanatory Necessity. The previous section pointed out an alternative explanation of The Core Insight: in cases of Bad Basing a believer can be blameworthy (or at least not praiseworthy) because he believes for inappropriate reasons, but his belief nevertheless remains doxastically justified. However, the TBD-defender might argue that there are other cases of Bad Basing in which a believer is not only blameless but praiseworthy. For example, such cases may involve evil demons who covertly cause one, despite one’s best efforts, to base a belief on poor considerations. With this the TBD-defender might be able to effectively argue that such cases would force us to take the missing positive epistemic property in cases of Bad Basing to be doxastic justification, thus making TBD necessary for explaining The Core Insight. 
I agree that in cases of covert deception a plausible case can be made for thinking that the epistemic defect cannot be blameworthiness. But it is unlikely that this conclusion would support TBD. First, the fact that there might be some cases of Bad Basing where we cannot explain The Core Insight unless one lacks doxastic justification because one bases a belief on inappropriate reasons is not sufficient to support TBD. For TBD is true only if one lacks doxastic justification in all cases of Bad Basing. Second, there are at least two positive epistemic properties other than doxastic justification that are intuitively lacking in all cases of Bad Basing, thus rendering TBD unnecessary for explaining The Core Insight when it comes to these special cases. For, as implied above, one can be blameless without being praiseworthy, and in all cases of Bad Basing it is intuitive to think that one fails to be praiseworthy in at least one respect even if one is blameless (or even praiseworthy) in other respects. For one is not praiseworthy or blameworthy simpliciter, one is praiseworthy or blameworthy for something, and in cases of Bad Basing one is intuitively not deserving praise for holding a belief when it is held in response to inappropriate reasons (e.g., suspicious looks, coin tosses, tarot card readings, etc.). But lack of praiseworthiness in this respect is consistent with being praiseworthy for, say, the degree of effort exerted in one’s pursuit of truth. By way of analogy, consider an archer who mistakenly believes it’s his task is to shoot animals that run across the field rather than shoot the target’s bullseye. He sees a bird, aims, and fires his shot. But as it happens he hits the bullseye, which was his actual task in the competition. Given the nature of the competition the archer was participating in, our archer is not praiseworthy for taking the shot he did because his reasons for taking the shot were mistaken. And people are not properly commended for actions which are driven by mistaken reasons even if one can be excused or praised due to, say, one’s good intentions and degree of effort. The same sort of thing is going on in cases of Bad Basing. In such cases one forms a belief, but not in way that is responsive to the right kind of reasons, and this prohibits one from being praiseworthy for their believing.​[23]​ 
There is another positive epistemic property missing in all cases of Bad Basing. For agents who fail to base their beliefs on epistemically appropriate reasons intuitively lack knowledge because of that failure. We’ll discuss this idea more in a moment, but the basic idea is that basing one’s belief in P (solely) on inappropriate reasons introduces a kind luck that is incompatible with knowing P. Suppose, for instance, one has a true belief but has based that belief on a suspicious look, a coin toss, tarot card readings, or some other epistemically inappropriate reason. The fact that one happens to believe truly is clearly due to a certain kind of accident that is as problematic as the kind of accidents involved in usual gettier cases. So yet again, we can identify another positive epistemic property that agents lack in cases of Bad Basing and we can explain that lack in terms of their failing to base their beliefs on epistemically appropriate reasons. This observation should augment our explanation of The Core Insight, for not only is that insight true for the reasons specified by (b*), but it is true also because bad basing prohibits knowledge. 
Since both praiseworthiness (in the specified respect) and knowledge will always be lacking in cases of Bad Basing because of one’s epistemically poor reasons for belief, it’s hard to see how this particular defense of the TBD-defender could succeed. For TBD simply isn’t needed to plausibly explain The Core Insight. 
Reason 3: Inseparability. My argument that cases of Bad Basing fail to adequately support TBD depends, in part, on the ability of doxastic justification to separate from blamelessness and praiseworthiness, i.e., it depends on the possibility that one can be blameworthy (or at least not praiseworthy) and yet have doxastic justification. Thus the TBD-defender might argue that this cannot occur. 
Without an argument, however, it’s hard to assess this objection. But there are a couple things to say in response. As we saw in section 2, both normative ethical theories and concrete moral cases offer reason to think that one can have moral justification and yet be blameworthy. So if there is a genuine problem here, it must be one that is peculiar to epistemology. But even in epistemology when it comes to blamelessness and praiseworthiness, it is common for epistemologists to not only distinguish these properties from (doxastic and propositional) justification, but to also allow them to separate from justification.​[24]​ Admittedly, the sort of separation I’m urging is atypical. Usually epistemologists wish to allow a thinker to be blameless while lacking (doxastic and propositional) justification, while (b*) says a thinker may be blameworthy (or at least not praiseworthy) for holding a given belief while having doxastic justification for that belief. Although this sort of separation is less common in epistemology, it is not unheard of.​[25]​ And, as I argued in the previous section, it is intuitive to think that just as in moral cases of “Bad Basing” where this occurs, it also occurs in epistemic cases of Bad Basing.​[26]​ 
So, in the end, we will need to be offered quite a compelling argument for thinking doxastic justification cannot separate from praise and blame if we’re to find here a special reason to favor TBD. 
Reason 4: Knowing and Basing. Perhaps the connection between doxastic justification and knowledge speaks in favor of TBD. Take the following: 
Common Conditions for Knowledge: S knows that P iff S has a true belief in P that is doxastically justified and ungettiered.

Recall the second juror in Derelict Juror, Miss Not, who clearly failed to know that Mansour was guilty because she based her belief in his guilt on his “suspicious look”. To lack knowledge Miss Not must either not believe P, lack a true belief, lack a doxastically justified belief, or be in a gettier situation. Miss Not clearly has a true belief and she doesn’t seem to be (or at least she needn’t be) in a gettier situation. So, by way of elimination, she must lack doxastic justification, and the only plausible explanation of why she lacks doxastic justification is that she has failed to base her belief on an epistemically appropriate reason. This seems to suggests that doxastic justification must have a basing requirement and hence that TBD is true. Call this the ‘Elimination Argument’. 
Clearly, knowledge has some kind of basing requirement akin to the following: 

Knowledge’s Basing Demand (KBD): S knows that P only if S has based her belief in P on an epistemically appropriate reason for P.

In general, many epistemologists have been at least tacitly committed to KBD since it follows from TBD and the traditional view that knowledge requires doxastic justification. KBD is extremely plausible for without KBD it would be possible for people to have knowledge that results from beliefs formed on the basis of coin tosses, tea leaf readings, and other risk-generating, epistemically inappropriate reasons (just think back to the cases of Bad Basing above).​[27]​ 
But the rejection of TBD does not mandate the rejection of KBD, rather it mandates an alternative explanation for KBD. One explanation might simply be that knowledge has a fundamental basing requirement, which is not to be explained in terms of other requirements on knowledge. If this is correct, then the Common Account of Knowledge is false because it needs the addition of a basing condition on it’s right hand side. This would dissolve the Elimination Argument in support of TBD. 
An alternative explanation for KBD might appeal to certain anti-gettier conditions on knowledge. For example, take: 

The Safety Condition: S knows that P only if S’s truly believing P (on basis b) could not have easily been mistaken.​[28]​
 This seems to imply that thinkers in sample cases of Bad Basing fail to have knowledge. Recall Miss Not who believed in Mansour’s guilt on the basis of his “suspicious look”. Such a basis for belief is unreliable and could easily have lead her to have a false belief, and thus be mistaken. Accordingly, this condition implies that Miss Not does not have knowledge. The same goes for the other cases of Bad Basing given above for they are cases where thinkers form true beliefs, but the bases of their beliefs could easily mislead. 
Although this further condition on knowledge prevents cases of Bad Basing from being cases of knowledge, it does not yet imply KBD. For that something like the following is needed: 

Unsafe Basing: If S’s belief in P is not based on an epistemically appropriate reason, then S’s truly believing P could have easily been mistaken.

The Safety Condition and UnSafe Basing jointly imply KBD, and Unsafe Basing is not implausible. After all, all cases of Bad Basing seem to be cases where one’s belief could easily have been mistaken owing to its epistemically poor basis. Thus it seems like Unsafe Basing may well follow. But a full defense of Unsafe Basing falls outside the scope of this paper.​[29]​ My aim here is just to show how one could attempt to resolve the Elimination Argument for TBD by appealing to an independently motivated anti-gettier condition that explains KBD in addition to resolving that argument by simply holding that KBD is a fundamental condition on knowledge. Either way, the Elimination Argument can be handled by those who would reject TBD. 
Reason 5: The Importance of Proper Basing. Some might worry that the rejection of TBD implies that basing one’s beliefs on epistemically appropriate reasons is epistemologically unimportant, which is extremely counterintuitive. 
On the contrary, basing one’s beliefs on epistemologically appropriate reasons remains very important insofar as one may be unable to have knowledge or be praiseworthy for holding a given belief if one fails to base that belief on an epistemically appropriate reason. Moreover, basing may also be epistemically important insofar as we might have an epistemic requirement to refrain from basing our beliefs on epistemically inappropriate reasons. Notice that such a requirement is consistent with the rejection of TBD. For we must distinguish a requirement not to have a belief under certain conditions from a requirement not to base a belief on certain kinds of reasons. Those who reject TBD can consistently maintain that although we may do epistemic wrong in basing our beliefs on epistemically inappropriate reasons, we needn’t thereby be doing any epistemic wrong in holding those particular beliefs. Accordingly, there might well be a basing requirement believers must satisfy. It’s just not a requirement on doxastic justification.​[30]​ 
Reason 6: TBD’s Free Ride. Finally, the TBD-defender might argue that our fundamental epistemic principles tether our sources of justification to the basing relation in such a way that TBD follows. For illustrative purposes take a very simplistic form of reliabilism that is committed to the following: 

(R) The only source of justification for one to believe P is a reliable belief forming processes that has caused (and continues to sustain) one’s belief in P. 
(B) A belief, b, is based on a belief forming process if b is caused (and sustained) by it.

Together, these imply no belief is doxastically justified unless it’s based on a source of justification (which we are temporarily assuming is the only kind of epistemically appropriate reason for belief). Thus, if (R) and (B) are true, so is TBD. 
Here, at last, we’ve found at least a possible reason to endorse TBD, and I agree that there may be defensible epistemological positions which entail TBD. Thus, the fact that we’ve been able to undermine the usual case for TBD should not be taken to be a decisive refutation of it. 
But there are important dialectical limitations for those who arrive at TBD through a prior commitment to other TBD-entailing principles such as (R) and (B). For the dialectical usefulness of TBD-involving arguments aimed at refuting or supporting views like coherentism, conservatism, and phenomenal foundationalism will depend entirely on whether on one is antecedently committed to (R) and (B) or some other collection of TBD-entailing principles. But absent such commitments, the TBD-involving arguments simply loose their dialectical power. For, unlike the above version of reliabilism, neither coherentism nor conservatism are essentially tied to any TBD-entailing principles. Thus the fact that (non-skeptical) coherentism and conservatism may be inconsistent with TBD is only a problem for those coherentists and conservatives who endorse TBD. The same point holds with respect to Huemer’s argument for phenomenal foundationalism. For unless one has antecedent reason to think TBD true, one will have no reason to endorse the second premise of Huemer’s argument. 
We’ve diligently sought reasons in the last two sections for TBD, but none have been forthcoming. TBD’s ability to help us explain The Central Insight was of little help for there is no reason to think a TBD-involving explanation of that insight is necessary, or even better than, the competing explanation (b*). So unless one has adequate reason to think (R) and (B) or some other collection of TBD-entailing principles is true, it would seem irrational to endorse TBD. Even if one had adequate reason to think some such principles are true, TBD would not have it’s assumed dialectical value. 
It should be emphasized at this point that I have not argued that (b*) is the best explanation of The Core Insight. I have only argued that (b*) is a reasonable explanation that has a kind of analogous precedent in moral philosophy, and that it cannot be ruled out because it’s inconsistent with TBD. So my argument is relatively modest, and the reason for this modesty has to do with how TBD is connected to more general epistemological positions. For example, TBD would be correct if, say, a form of reliabilism like the one discussed above were true. But, as indicated above, this would make TBD dialectically inefficacious in a range of disputes. 
4 How to Resist Revenge
A significant implication of what’s been argued so far is the fact that the failure of (or at least undermining of) TBD defuses the argument against coherentism, the argument against conservatism, the argument for phenomenal foundationalism, and potentially many other TBD-dependent arguments. But one might think that this is too good to be true and that these TBD-dependent arguments can be re-instated at the level of knowledge given that knowledge has a basing requirement, as expressed by KBD. 
Here’s one way this could be done: 

(KBD-coherentism) One knows that P only if one bases one’s belief in P on the fact that P coheres with one’s overall belief system. 
(No Basis) We cannot (or at least typically do not) base our beliefs on facts about what coheres with what. 
Therefore, 
(Knowledge Skepticism) We cannot (or at least typically do not) have knowledge.

Now, (KBD-coherentism) follows from KBD, the coherentist view that facts about coherence are the only source of justification, and the assumption we made at the beginning of this paper concerning epistemically appropriate reasons, which we will now refer to as: 

The Basing Ideal. R is an epistemically appropriate reason on which S can base their belief in P only if R is one’s source of justification to believe P.

For those who would resist the reforging of the TBD-dependent arguments in a way that relies on KBD, I suggest resistance to The Basing Ideal. After all, one of the principal reasons for insisting on The Basing Ideal is the fact that part of what makes epistemically appropriate reasons epistemically appropriate is their connection to truth. It’s a connection that guarantees that beliefs based on such reasons are not susceptible to being merely accidentally correct.​[31]​ To be sure, basing a belief on one’s source of justification will ensure as much. But there are ways of having non-accidentally correct beliefs that doesn’t depend on basing them on one’s sources of justification. For example, suppose that perceptual experiences are as we think they are, i.e., reliably correlated with the external world (in normal conditions) such that beliefs based on them are typically true. This latter fact about perceptual experience ensures that, in general, beliefs based on them are not going to be merely accidentally correct, even if they are not, all by themselves, a source of justification as coherentism and conservatism say. Should the reliability of perceptual experiences be deemed insufficient to make non-sources of justification epistemically appropriate reasons for belief, that is fine. For, as coherentists and conservatives both maintain, we also have propositional justification to believe our perceptual experiences are reliable as well.​[32]​ And this is enough to make a strong case for the idea that perceptual experiences are epistemically appropriate bases for belief even if they fall short of being justificatory sources all on their own.​[33]​ 
There is much more to be said here should one wish to defend coherentism and conservatism and other views threatened by KBD. But my aim in this last section was not so much to defend either of these views as it was to show that KBD cannot be used to easily refute either view. For the refutation hangs on The Basing Ideal and there are plausible ways for coherentists and conservatives to resist that assumption, and thus resist (Knowledge Skepticism). Similarly, KBD cannot be used to easily demonstrate phenomenal foundationalism, to do that one would also need The Basing Ideal. 






Alston, W. 1989. Epistemic Justification, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Arpaly, N. 2002. “Moral Worth,” Journal of Philosophy 99/5: 223-245. 
Arpaly, N. and T. Schroeder. 2014​. In Praise of Desire, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Berker, S. 2013. “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions,” Philosophical Review 122/3: 337-393. 
BonJour, L. 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Booth and Peels. 2010. “Why Responsible Belief is Blameless Belief,” Journal of Philosophy 107/5: 257-265. 
Chisholm, R. 1977. Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed., Englewood: Prentice-Hall. 
Christensen, D. 2004. Putting Logic in its Place, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cohen, S. 2002. “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65/2: 309-329. 
Cohen, S. 2010. “Bootstrapping, Defeasible Reasoning, and A Priori Justification,” Philosophical Perspectives 24/1: 141-159. 
Comesana, J. and M. McGrath. Forthcoming. “Having False Reasons,” Epistemic Norms, eds. C. Littlejohn and J. Turri, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Feldman, R. 2002. Epistemology, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. 
Feldman, R. and E. Conee. 1985. “Evidentialism,” Philosophical Studies 48/1: 15-34. 
Ginet, C. 2005. “Alston on Epistemic Justification,” Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston, eds. H. D. Battaly and M. P. Lynch, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: 37-54. 
Goldman, A. 1986. Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Goldman, A. 1988. “Strong and Weak Justification,” Philosophical Perspectives 2: 51-69. 
Goldman, A. 2009. “Internalism, externalism, and the architecture of justification,” Journal of Philosophy 106/6: 309-338. 
Greco, J. 1990. “Internalism and Epistemically Responsible Belief,” Synthese 85/2: 245-277. 
Greco, J. 2003. “Knowledge as credit for true belief,” Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, eds. M. DePaul & L. Zagzebski, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 111–134.
Heyd, D. 2011. “Supererogation,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/ supererogation/>. 
Huemer, M. 2007. “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74/1: 30-55. 
Hursthouse, R. 1999. On Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ichikawa, J. and M. Steup. 2012. “The Analysis of Knowledge,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/>. 
Kim, J. 1988. “What is “Naturalized Epistemology?”” Philosophical Perspectives 2: 381-405. 
Korcz, K. 2000. “The Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30/4: 525–550. 
Kroedel, T. 2012. “The Lottery Paradox, Epistemic Justification and Permissibility,” Analysis 72/1: 57– 60. 
Kvanvig, J. 2003. “Justification and Proper Basing,” The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, ed. Erik Olsson, Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishing Co.: 43-62. 
Littlejohn, C. 2012. Justification and the Truth-Connection, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lycan, W. 1985. “Epistemic Value,” Synthese 64/2: 137-164. 
Lycan, W. 2012. “Explanationist Rebuttals (Coherentism Defended Again),” Southern Journal of Philosophy 50/1: 5-20. 
Markovitz, J. 2010. “Acting for the Right Reasons,” Philosophical Review 119/2: 201-242. 
Mill, J. S. 2002. Utilitarianism, ed. G. Sher, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. 
Moore. G. E. 1966. Ethics, London: Oxford University Press. 
Neta, R. 2010. “Liberalism and Conservatism in the Epistemology of Perceptual Belief,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88/4: 685-705. 
Oakley, T. 1988. “Skepticism and the Diversity of Epistemic Justification,” Philosophical Quarterly 38/152: 263-279. 
Plantinga, A. 1983. “Reason and Belief in God,” Faith and Rationality, eds. A. Plantinga and N. Wolterstorff, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press. 
Pollock, J. and J. Cruz. 1999. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd ed., New York: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Pritchard, D. 2012. “Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology,” Journal of Philosophy 109/3: 247-279. 
Pryor, J. 2001. “Highlights in Recent Epistemology,” British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 52/1: 95-124. 
Pryor, J. 2005. “There is Immediate Justification,” Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, eds. M. Steup and E. Sosa, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing: 181-201. 
Ross, W. D. 2002. The Right and the Good, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Silins, N. 2007. “Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic,” Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 2, eds. T. S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 108-142.
Silva, P. Forthcoming a. “On Doxastic Justification and Properly Basing One’s Beliefs,” Erkenntnis.
Silva, P. Forthcoming b. “The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Silva, P. 2013. “How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91/3: 501-514.
Smithies, D. 2012. “Moore’s Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85/2: 273-300. 
Steup, M. 2001. “Epistemic duty, evidence, and internality,” Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue, ed. M. Steup, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 134–48.
Sutton, J. 2005. “Stick to What You Know,” Nous 39/3: 359-396. 
Tucker, C. 2010. “Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism,” Philosophical Perspectives 24/1: 529-545. 
Turri, J. 2010. “On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80/2: 312-326. 
Weatherson, B. 2008. “Deontology and Descartes’s Demon,” Journal of Philosophy 105/9:540-569. 
Wedgwood, R. 2012. “Justified Inference,” Synthese 189/2: 273-295. 
White, R. 2006. “Problems for Dogmatism,” Philosophical Studies 131/3: 525-557. 
Wright, C. 2007. “Perils of Dogmatism,” Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology, eds. S. Nuccetelli & G. Seay, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 25-48.
Wolterstorff, N. 1983. “Can Belief in God Be Rational if It Has No Foundations?” Faith and Rationality, eds. A. Plantinga and N. Wolterstorff, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.






^1	 	Most also regard these conditions as jointly sufficient (cf. Turri [2010] and Silva [forthcoming a]). Although the focus of this paper is not on what necessary conditions are jointly sufficient for having doxastic justification, an upshot of this discussion will be that a case can be made for thinking that the first two necessary conditions are jointly sufficient. Though I will not explore that issue here.
^2	 	To simplify matters, let’s understand ‘source of justification’ in such a way that one has such a source only if one actually has all things considered propositional justification. This is misleading insofar as sometimes our sources of justification are only sources of a small degree of propositional justification or of mere prima facie propositional justification (owing to the presence of defeating factors). For present purposes we can ignore this complication.
^3	 	For instance, Comesana and McGrath [forthcoming], Kvanvig [2003: 43-44], Feldman [2002: 46], Pryor [2001: 104], Feldman and Conee [1985], Lycan [2012], Huemer [2007: 40], Turri [2010], Littlejohn [2012], Ichikawa and Steup [2012], Neta [2010], and Silins [2007: 109]. However, there is less agreement on just how the basing relation is to be analyzed (e.g., as a causal relation, as a doxastic relation, as a counterfactual relation). For present purposes, one’s exact account of the basing relation will not matter. 
^4	 	Cf. Cohen [2002: 325] and Korcz [2000: 550].
^5	 	White [2006], Cohen [2002], and Wright [2007].
^6	 	For further discussion see Neta [2010] who regards this argument as “a compelling reason” to reject conservatism.
^7	 	For some other applications see Comesana and McGrath’s [forthcoming] defense of the idea that reasons can be false, and Littlejohn’s [2012: 122] argument for the factivity of doxastic justification.
^8	 	It should be noted that some epistemologists have rejected TBD in a completely unqualified form. For example, Goldman’s [2009: 337] discussion of the doxastic justification of memorial beliefs allows for one to have doxastically justified memorial beliefs that are not based on any ground (= reason). But even so Goldman doesn’t go so far as claiming that basing one’s beliefs on epistemically appropriate reasons is never necessary. For example, Goldman [2009: 316, fn12; 337-338] is explicit that basing is required if an inferential belief is to be doxastically justified, and he nowhere rejects (and even implicitly seems amenable to) the idea that basing is also required for percpetual bleiefs to be doxastically justified (see Goldman [2009: 337-338]). I suspect many other externalists would likewise follow him in wanting a qualified permutation of TBD. In what follows I mean to challenge even such restricted versions of TBD.
^9	 	For others who connect justification to permissibility see Berker [2013], Goldman [2009], Plantinga [1983: 52], Ginet [2005: 140], Kroedel [2012], Littlejohn [2012: 157], Steup [2001], and see also Kim [1988: 383], Wolterstorff [1983: 144], Oakley [1988: 271], Lycan [1985: 137].
^10	 	Some prefer to explicate justification in terms of “responsibility”, but this is often, in turn, explicated in terms of permissibility or the related notion of requirement (Chisholm [1977], BonJour [1985: 8], Greco [1990: 246]). Some prefer to explicate justification in terms of appropriateness/fittingness (Pryor [2005: 181]; Feldman and Conee [1985: 15]) while others prefer to think of it in terms of goodness (Alston [1989: 105]; cf. Christensen [2004: 161]; Smithies [2012]). We can imagine other possibilities too: perhaps justification is just the conjunction of (or the disjunction of) permissibility, goodness, and appropriateness (cf. Silva [forthcoming b]). We needn’t sort out these matters here. For even taken conjunctively (or disjunctively) the lesson from the disanalogy to follow will stand.
^11	 	Mill [2002: 18-19] and G. E. Moore [1966: 101].
^12	 	In cases where prima facie duties conflict what one is morally justified in doing is determined by the more stringent duty. We can ignore this complication.
^13	 	For discussion of TBD’s failure in the deontological framework of Kant see Arpaly [2002].
^14	 	Hursthouse [1999].
^15	 	Lest one’s consequentialist intuitions spoil the example, let us suppose Jack’s exploitative intentions would fail and that such acts typically fail or else have excellent long-term consequences.
^16	 	Mill [1979: 17-18], Arpaly [2002: 224-225], Markovitz [2010], and Arpaly and Schroeder [2014].
^17	 	Huemer [2007, 40-41].
^18	 	Turri [2010, 312].
^19	 	For alternative cases of Bad Basing used by epistemologists see Feldman [2002: 46], Pollock and Cruz [1999: 35], Ichikawa and Steup [2012], and Kvanvig [2003: 43-44]. It should be noted that often cases of Bad Basing are given by epistemologists not so much with the aim of defending TBD, but rather with the aim of illustrating that propositional and doxastic justification come apart when one fails to base their belief on an epistemically appropriate reason. For present purposes this makes little difference, for cases of Bad Basing wouldn’t illustrate this unless they also supported TBD to some extent. However, as pointed out by an AJP referee, the support such cases can offer TBD is limited so long as it’s possible to have doxastically justified beliefs that are based on no reasons whatsoever. Indeed, this is something The Core Insight leaves open.
^20	 	There may be multiple principles which explain this insight insofar as there may be multiple positive epistemic properties missing in cases of Bad Basing. Should that be the case (and I will argue that it is below) The Core Insight will have multiple explanations. However, our emphasis will be on the explanation TBD offers and on an alternative explanation that is inconsistent with TBD.
^21	 	Arpaly [2002], Markovitz [2010], and Arpaly and Schroeder [2014].
^22	 	For explicit endorsements Alston [1989: 145], Goldman [1988], Christensen [2004], Feldman and Conee [1985: 17], Pryor [2001: 114-117], Smithies [2012: 279], Sutton [2005: 369], and Littlejohn [2012: 4-11]. But any epistemologist who holds that justification is not blamelessness or praiseworthiness (see footnotes 11 and 12) will be committed to (a*).
^23	 	This general point has been made by virtue epistemologists. For example, Greco [2003: 123] argues that one is not deserving of credit (i.e., one is not praiseworthy) for holding a true belief unless one’s belief reveals one’s reliable cognitive character. Clearly, beliefs formed for epistemically inappropriate reasons offer no such revelation, and hence are not creditworthy. Some virtue epistemologists go on to make praiseworthiness for believing a necessary condition for knowledge, but we needn’t go so far as this to appreciate the general point that one is not praiseworthy for holding a belief when one believes for inapproriate reasons.
^24	 	Alston [1989], Goldman [1988], Christensen [2004], Feldman and Conee [1985: 17], Pryor [2001: 14-17], Smithies [2012: 279], Sutton [2005: 369], and Littlejohn [2012: 4-11] are but a few of the many possible examples. Even those who have recently discussed justification as being identical to a kind of blamelessness/ praiseworthiness have not outright endorsed the view (see Weatherson [2008: 567] and Booth and Peels [2010]).
^25	 	For example Tucker [2010: 541].
^26	 	A referee pointed out to me that it might be that anything that makes one blameworthy also defeats one’s justification. This would, in turn, prevent one from being blameworthy and yet having doxastic justification. In this way much might hang on the disjunctive nature of my claim that one may be blameworthy or at least not praiseworthy for holding a given belief while having doxastic justification for that belief. Notice that this is in step with what moral theorists such as Arpaly [2002] and Markovitz [2010] think about moral cases of “Bad Basing”. In their language: one who acts from morally inappropriate reasons performs an action without positive moral worth (= one is not praiseworthy for performing the action) even if the action is morally desirable (roughly, it’s an action that is neither wrong nor bad).
^27	 	An AJP referee noted that the transition from cases of Bad Basing to basing requirements like TBD and KBD move a bit too quickly. At most such cases show that one cannot have knowledge or (possibly) doxastic justification if one has based their belief on an epistemically inappropriate reason. But this, all by itself, doesn’t imply that one must always base their belief on appropriate reasons. That is, there might be a special class of beliefs that need no grounds in order to be known and justified (e.g., see Goldman’s [2009] discussion of memorial beliefs). However, in what follows I will make the stronger assumption that KBD is true and well supported since the present objection to my thesis looses its potency if we were to reject KBD.
^28	 	Pritchard [2012]. 
^29	 	To fully justify Unsafe Basing it’s not enough to show that beliefs based on epistemically inappropriate bases rob one’s belief of safety. One must also show that the absence of any basis whatsoever also jeopardizes safety. Of course, any counterexamples to Unsafe Basing along these lines will also likely be counterexamples to KBD, and thus also motivate further qualification to it as well as TBD.
^30	 	I’m grateful to an AJP referee for pointing this out to me.
^31	 	Obviously, basing a belief on epistemically appropriate reasons will not inoculate a belief against gettier-style luck. But it does inoculate beliefs against another kind, the kind that has to do with believing on the basis of reasons that are entirely detached from truth.
^32	 	Cohen [2010] and White [2006].
^33	 	The integrity of this point implicitly relies on something like the following: If S has propositional justification to believe that reasons of kind K are reliable indicators of true claims of type T, then considerations of kind K are epistemically appropriate reasons on which one can base their beliefs about claims of type T. This is defensible. In unreflective moments I form beliefs about how much gas is in my car after having a visual experience of the direction the needle in the gas dial is pointing. It is not part of the content of my visual experience of the dial that my car has a certain amount of gas only that the needle is pointing in a certain direction. Suppose then, as is clearly possible (and I think also plausible), that I form the belief that my car has half a tank of gas just on the basis of my visual experience of the needle’s direction. Is my belief based on an epistemically inappropriate reason? Put differently, is my visual experience of the gas gauge as a basis for belief on an epistemic par with my visual experience of, say, the windshield wipers or something equally arbitrary? Intuitively it is not, and intuitively this is because of the fact that I have justification to believe that my gas gague is a reliable indicator of the amount of gas in my car. So even if conservatism and coherentism are false, there are at least prima facie reasons for thinking that we can have epistemically appropriate reasons for belief that are not sources of justification all on their own. But a full defense of this thesis is beyond the scope of this paper. However, see Silva [2013] for a related discussion. 
^34	  I am grateful to the AJP’s referees for their very helpful comments.
